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Abstract
We develop a model of cultural transmission where television plays a role in socialization.
We study the coverage of di¤erent cultural traits by a prot maximizing TV industry and the
resulting cultural dynamics. Our model predicts that cultural extinction is more likely in a
competitive than in a monopolistic TV industry. A monopolist covers both traits but grants
more coverage to the most protable group. In a competitive TV industry each channel
specializes on one trait. This might lead to cultural extinction but only for su¢ ciently
large majorities so that all channels specialize on the same trait. The required majority
size depends on the type of competitors: the presence of a pay-TV competitor reduces the
probability of cultural extinction. Overall our model predicts that cultural extinction can
only occur under very special circumstances suggesting that the fear voiced by policy makers
seems exaggerated.
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1 Introduction
In recent years the study of cultural transmission of preferences has mushroomed.1 In this literature
cultural transmission is conceptualized as resulting from two forces: direct vertical socialization
from parents to children and oblique and horizontal socialization by society at large. Although
television has become the primary source of socialization in many modern societies (Gerbner et al.,
2002) its role as an oblique socialization mechanism2 has been ignored in the cultural transmission
literature despite the existing evidence that television can change cultural traits and beliefs.3
In the political debate the idea that television can transform culture has been prominent. An
unregulated television industry is sometimes perceived as a threat to cultural diversity. A common
argument for maintaining public television is to ensure that diverse and high-quality programming
is supplied that caters to the entire population, hence to all communities and cultures.4 Politicians
who care about local culture often feel that TV imports threaten local diversity and argue that
TV programs should have the status of cultural exceptionsand not be subject to free trade, a
view that was approved in 2005 by the UNESCO in its Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity.
Protectionist measures have also been passed by the European Union in the 2007 Audiovisual Me-
dia Service Directive. Quotas for home productions are very common around the world. However,
how real is the threat of cultural extinction? The argument that television can lead to a cultural
change and hence might wipe some cultures o¤ the map is too simplistic, since it overlooks that
people who care about their culture will take this danger into account when deciding their TV
demand. Moreover, an unregulated prot maximizing TV industry optimally chooses the program
contents given peoples demand. The cultural dynamics resulting from these strategic interactions
might not be as simplistic as the political debate suggests.
1Bisin and Verdier (2010) provide a comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical contributions to the
literature.
2In the most standard approach (see e.g. Bisin and Verdier, 2001) the probability to acquire a cultural trait
via oblique transmission equals its proportion in the population, hence the inuence of a trait through society
depends on its size. Saez-Marti and Sjögren (2008) have generalized the oblique cultural transmission function
by formalizing merit-guided learning on part of the children by their peers. Patacchini and Zenou (forthcoming)
look at neighborhood e¤ects. Other papers have modelled education by schools as additional forms of oblique
transmission (see e.g. Hauk and Saez-Marti, 2002) or have provided evidence about the empirical relevance of
collective socialization mechanisms (see e.g. Aspachs-Bracons et al., 2008).
3This evidence will be discussed in Section 2.
4This argument was put forward by the pioneer in broadcasting economics, Peacock (Towse, 2005).
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In the present paper we develop a model of cultural transmission where television plays the
role of oblique socialization which allows us to study the coverage of di¤erent cultural traits by
a prot maximizing TV industry and the resulting cultural dynamics. We look at a society with
two cultural traits which di¤er in size, cultural intolerance and advertisement sensitivity. In our
model parents dispose of one unit of free time which they have to split between socializing their
child which is costly or watching TV. As in Bisin and Verdier (2001) time spent in socialization
determines the probability that socialization is successful and hence the probability of direct
socialization. However, and this is our main innovation, if direct socialization fails, the child
is socialized by television. As in socialization analysis (Gerbner et al., 2002) we assume that
the child is a¤ected by the entire system of messages received by the television program. These
messages consist of the amount of coverage of each cultural trait which determines the probability
that the child will adopt this trait conditionally on being socialized by television. Hence, while
watching television is entertaining, parents are aware that television might infect the child with the
wrongcultural values. The television industry is not interested in the propagation of cultural
values per se. Cultural coverage is chosen strategically to maximize prots since it inuences the
viewing time and thereby the advertisement revenue of a rm. We examine di¤erent industry
structure: a monopolistic TV industry, competition between free-to-air rms, a pay TV-duopoly
and a mixed duopoly with one pay-TV and one free-to-air rm. We study how the nature of
competition a¤ects the coverage of the di¤erent cultural traits, parentsoptimal time allocation
between socialization and TV time and the long run survival of the cultural traits. A monopolistic
media industry captures more TV time from the most protable group.5 We show that the
protability of a group and also its coverage  increases in its size, advertisement sensitivity
and cultural intolerance. Since parental socialization and TV time are cultural substitutes (Bisin
and Verdier, 2001), parents belonging to the less protable group (which would coincide with
the minority if groups were symmetric except for size) socialize more intensively their children.
Therefore, cultural elimination will never occur under a monopolistic media industry.6 In contrast,
with a competitive media industry cultural extinction is possible. If there are various channels
parents choose the one which gives them a higher utility, by for example granting more coverage
5Unless the entertainment value is very large relative to cultural intolerance in which case full TV coverage of
both groups can be achieved.
6Unless TV does not provide any entertainment value.
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to their cultural trait. This makes specialization by each channel on one single culture a dominant
strategy. As a consequence when the protability of one group is particularly large, the media
industry will cover that group only, leading to less programming for the minority than in the
monopoly case. The likelihood of cultural extinction is highest under duopoly. When all channels
cover the more protable trait, the incentives to deviate to cover the less protable trait increase
in the number of competing rms. Moreover, the presence of a pay-TV reduces the likelihood of
cultural extinction. Pay-TV rms will charge a positive (indeed maximal) price, if they specialize
on di¤erent traits and therefore have less incentives to cover the same trait. In terms of cultural
survival, pure pay-TV competition dominates a mixed duopoly which dominates pure free-to-air
competition. Overall our model predicts that cultural extinction can only occur under very special
circumstances which suggests that the fear voiced by policy makers seems exaggerated.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates our main modelling
assumptions. In Section 3 we present the basic model with symmetric traits except for size and
we solve the model with a monopolistic free-to-air TV industry. Section 4 analyzes the di¤erent
types of competitive TV industries and their e¤ect on cultural survival. Section 5 is dedicated
to robustness. We show that endogenizing the entertainment value, allowing entertainment to
depend on cultural intolerance and coverage or introducing various asymmetries across traits does
not alter our main results. We also discuss how important is our assumption that the TV industry
is myopic and what would happen if cultural intolerance evolved over time. Finally, section 6
discusses existing evidence for the empirical predictions and concludes. All proofs not following
immediately from the main text are relegated to the appendices.
2 Motivating evidence
Our model is based on three crucial assumptions: (i) television can lead to cultural change, (ii)
the inuence of TV is bigger the more time children spend watching TV (iii) parents are aware
of this possibility and act accordingly. In what follows we provide some motivating evidence for
these assumptions.
In recent years, economists have documented that the messages received by television may
a¤ect a large spectrum of beliefs and behaviors. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) nd that being
exposed to television programs in the Islamic world has an e¤ect on the way people judge the
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west. Della Vigna and Kaplan (2007) show that Fox News Channel has an important role in
explaining votes in the US. Other papers address the role of television on socioeconomic outcomes
in developing countries. La Ferrara et al. (2008) study the e¤ects of television on fertility choices
in Brazil and nd that women living in areas covered by the Globo signal have signicantly lower
fertility.7 Chong and La Ferrara (2009) nd that the share of women who are separated or divorced
increases signicantly after the Globo signal becomes available. Jensen and Oster (2009) using
data on ve Indian states show that the entry of cable TV led to increases in subjective measures of
female autonomy and declines in pregnancy rates. Finally, Olken (2006) studies the e¤ect of radio
and television on social capital in Indonesia and nds that increased signal reception, which leads
to more time watching television and listening to the radio, is associated with less participation
in social organizations and with lower self-reported trust. Communication scientists (Shanahan
and Morgan, 1999) have been studying how television a¤ects culture long before economists.
They labeled their eld of studies Cultivation Theorybecause exposure to television over time
cultivates viewersperceptions of reality.8 One of the central hypothesis in cultivation research
coincides with our assumption (ii), namely that heavy TV viewers are more likely to be socialized
by television than light viewers. This hypothesis was successfully tested by Gerbner already in 1968
within the US. Other studies provide evidence on the e¤ect of TV imports. For the Philippines
Tan et al. (1987) showed that heavy viewers of American television evidenced non-traditional
values, more like those shown by the television programs than the traditional values of their
Philippine homeland. Viewers in Australia had di¤erent views of Australian life if they watched
more American television (Pingree and Hawkins, 1981). Tan and Suarchavarat (1988) provide
evidence that the Thai people are becoming more vindictive and are abandoning the traditional
forgiveness derived from Buddhism because of Chinese and Japanese television inuences. The
above evidence suggests that TV can lead to cultural change and that its inuence is stronger for
heavier viewers. But are parents aware of this? One of the most extreme examples of parents
worrying that their culture might be endangered by television is found in Granzberg et al.s (1977)
study of the Cree culture: The most traditional people in Cree society refuse to have TV in their
7Globo is a network that had a virtual monopoly on telenovelas in Brazil.
8They argue that Television is the source of the most broadly shared images and messages in history...Television
cultivates from infancy the very predispositions and preferences that used to be acquired from other primary sources
... The repetitive pattern of televisions mass-produced messages and images forms the mainstream of a common
symbolic environment(Gerbner et al. (1986) p. 17 18).
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homes or feel it necessary to destroy a newly bought TV, or at least refuse to allow their children
to watch scary programs.
3 The basic model
We consider a society with overlapping generations and an innitely lived media industry. At any
point in time, the society consists of old and young individuals with generation size 1. Individuals
are born without any well-dened preferences and acquire one of two possible cultural traits when
young. At the beginning of each period, the media industry chooses the coverage of the cultural
traits in society (program contents). Each member of the old generation (adult) has a child (the
new generation) and decides how much to invest in the direct socialization of the child. Time
not spent in direct socialization is used for watching TV which has two functions: it provides
entertainment and serves as the oblique socialization mechanism. Parental choices together with
media coverage determine the transmission of cultural values and lead to the socialization of the
young generation. Todays children become tomorrows adults and replace the old generation that
dies and the next period begins.
We start our analysis with the simplest model where cultural traits are symmetric except for
group size. In particular, both cultural groups prefer their own cultural trait with value V to the
other cultural trait to which they attribute value v. Hence, V = V   v measures the cultural
intolerance in society. Without loss of generality we refer to trait 1 as the majority trait, i.e. it
has size n  1
2
. We analyze di¤erent media industry structures with one common choice variable,
namely the coverage qi of trait i with the restriction that q1 + q2 = 1. Parents make their time
use decisions after observing this coverage. We normalize the individualsamount of time to 1
and denote by ti the amount of time devoted by a parent of trait i to the socialization of his child,
1   ti; is dedicated to watching TV/let the child watch TV with a known entertainment value
.9 While no e¤ort is required to watch TV, we assume that educating ones child has a cost 
beyond the missed entertainment value from watching TV given by c(ti) = 12ct
2
i . The danger of
watching television is that the child might get infectedby the cultural values transmitted by the
9For the time being we assume that this entertainment value is given and independent of cultural intolerance
and coverage. We will relax this assumption in Section 5.2. We will also allow for the entertainment value to be
chosen strategically by the media industry in Section 5.1.
6
television program. In other words, if direct socialization fails, the child is socialized by the TV.
Hence, watching TV can lead to a trait change, the probability of which depends on the coverage
of the di¤erent traits in TV: (1  ti)qi is the probability that a child who has not been successfully
educated by his parent still acquires his parents trait by watching TV while (1  ti) (1  qi) is the
probability of a trait change.
Parents have imperfect empathy10, i.e. they evaluate their childs utility as if it was their own.
This implies that parents judge the costs and benets of their child watching TV with their own
preferences and decide the childs TV time based on the program content and their socialization
cost. Hence, for our model to work, we do not need to assume that parents and children watch TV
together or watch the same programs.11 The parents maximization problem is therefore given by
max
ti
(1  ti) + tiV + (1  ti)qiV + (1  ti)(1  qi)v   1
2
ct2i (1)
leading to the parental optimal choice12
ti =
(
V (1 qi) 
c
if qi < bq = 1  V
0 if qi  bq: (2)
Equation (2) tells us that parents substitute from the relatively less benecial to the relatively
more benecial activities: TV time 1  ti is decreasing in cultural intolerance V and increasing
both in the entertainment value,  and in the cost of socialization, c. The expressions also illustrate
that socialization and TV coverage are cultural substitutes and parents therefore free-ride on trait
transmission by television. TV time increases in the coverage of ones own trait. A high coverage
of ones own trait, increasing the probability of keeping the trait, implies zero socialization e¤ort.
We assume that
Assumption 1 c  V     0
10While we embrace the imperfect empathy assumption, there is also an ample literature which investigates
cultural transmission without it. See e.g. Corneo and Jeanne (2009) and Dessi (2008).
11However it seems that parental TV time is similar to child TV time and that this activity is often synchronized
within the household. Indeed, Cardoso et al. (2010) reveal the widespread inuence of parental time use on the
childs time use: in the three countries analyzed (France, Germany and Italy) both the mothers and the fathers
share of time spent watching TV has a positive impact on the share of time the youngster allocates to that activity.
12It is immediate to see that the second-order condition for a maximum is satised.
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which insures that parental socialization e¤ort is always smaller or equal to 1 and is not zero
for all possible qi: The case c < V    is less interesting from a theoretical point of view since
it implies no TV time for any q 6= 1 and hence no trait change but also no TV coverage.
Equation (2) gives us the optimal parental choice no matter how media coverage is determined
in the media industry. Next we analyze both monopolistic and competitive media industries
starting with a monopolistic free-to-air TV.
3.1 Monopolistic free-to-air media industry
A monopolistic free to air media industry decides the coverage of each cultural trait to maximize
its revenue from advertisement which is given by
 = max
qi
 [n (1  t1) + (1  n) (1  t2)] (3)
where n is the group size of trait 1 and  is the advertisement revenue of the media industry per
unit of time spent watching television which we will refer to as peoples advertisement sensitivity.13
From (2) we know that for a parent of trait i TV time is 1 if the coverage is larger than bq = 1  
V
.
Observe that bq larger than 1
2
is equivalent to V > 2. Hence for V  2, the monopolistic
media industry can get full TV time from both traits by setting q1  bq and q2  bq since 2bq < 1.
The media industry can choose an optimal cultural coverage mix that totally satises both groups,
since the entertainment value of watching TV is large relative to cultural intolerance. If instead
V > 2; the entertainment value is relatively small compared to cultural intolerance. Increasing
the time one group watches TV implies decreasing the time the other group watches TV. Therefore,
the media industry chooses to capture more TV time from the more protable group, which in
this context coincides with the bigger group as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Media coverage and prots) The TV coverage and the corresponding prots
are as follows:
1. If V  2, then any 1  
V
 qi  V is optimal. Both traits watch TV all the time and
 = .
13The e¤ect of heterogeneity in advertisement sensitivity and cultural intolerance will be described in Section
5.3.
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2. If V > 2, then only the smaller group invests in socialization t2 =
V 2
c
while the bigger
group watches TV all the time t1 = 0. The optimal coverages are q

1 = 1  V , q2 = V and
prots are
 = 

n+ (1  n)

c+ 2  V
c

: (4)
Proof. See Appendix A.1
Notice that while group size determines the TV coverage chosen by the media industry, the
size of the coverage itself and therefore also the socialization e¤orts by parents (equation (2)) are
independent of group size. This simplies the dynamic analysis which we undertake next.
3.2 Dynamics
Group 1 is initially a majority, i.e. n0  12 . At date t+ 1 its group size nt+1 is given by
nt+1 = nt (t1 + (1  t1)q1) + (1  nt)(1  t2)q1 (5)
Trait 1 parents will have a trait 1 child if socialization is successful (with probability t1) or if
socialization fails (with probability 1   t1) and their child is successfully socialized by television
(with probability q1). Moreover, some trait 1 individuals of the next generation will stem from
those trait 2 parents (1   nt) who were unsuccessful at socialization and whose children were
socialized by TV to trait 1 (with probability (1  t2)q1).
If parents do not socialize their children, which happens if the entertainment value of TV is large
relative to cultural intolerance V  2; media coverage fully determines group size. However, if
some socialization occurs, the long run steady state results from an interplay between direct and
oblique socialization. Bisin and Verdier (2001) distinguish between social environments that act
as substitutes or complements to parental socialization. They show that cultural heterogeneity
obtains whenever direct vertical socialization is a substitute to oblique/horizontal socialization.
This condition, essentially, requires that parents socialize more intensively children when their
cultural trait is minoritarian. The driving force in our dynamics (equation 5) is also cultural
substitution. If a trait is minoritarian the media coverage is biased against this trait (Proposition
1) which causes parents to reduce TV time and intensify direct socialization (equation 2). This
insight allows us to conclude that while for q1 = 0 the steady state converges to n = 0 and for
9
q1 = 1 the steady state converges to n = 1, only the interior steady state n is stable where
n =
(1  t2)q1
1  (t1 + (t2   t1)q1)
(6)
and since n0 > 12 the system will converge to
nb = 1 
c
cV   (V   2) (V   ) (7)
obtained by substituting in (6) the optimal media coverage q1 and the corresponding socialization
e¤orts derived in Proposition 1.14 With symmetric cultural traits group size uniquely determines
the optimal media coverage. The group which is initially a minority, will stay a minority, will get
less coverage and exert some socialization e¤ort, while the initial majority group will entirely rely
on trait transmission by the TV.
The following proposition summarizes our ndings:
Proposition 2 (Steady states) Let no  12 . Then the stable steady states are as follows:
1. If V  2; media coverage fully determines group size since parents do not socialize:
n = q1 with 1  V  q1  V .
2. If V > 2, then the system converges to nb dened by (7) where only minority parents
socialize and majority parents fully rely on socialization by the media industry.
Since only the interior steady state is stable, we can conclude that a monopolistic free-to-air
TV industry preserves cultural diversity. Cultural diversity is maximized if V = 2. In this
case, the monopolistic TV industry can capture full TV time of both traits by giving them equal
coverage, hence n = 1
2
:15 IfV > 2 the initially bigger group will stay a majority in the long run.
Its nal size will be bigger, the higher are parental socialization costs c (equation 7). Increasing
V has two e¤ects: (i) the media industry needs to increase the coverage of trait 1 to ensure
full TV time, (ii) trait 2 reduces TV time (Proposition 1). For all parameter values satisfying
Assumption 1 the size of the majority trait increases in steady state as long as the minority trait
14Observe that by Assumption 1 nb  12 .
15This equilibrium can be sustained if the entertainment value of TV increases, however, a continuum of possible
equilibria arises and we cannot predict the exact outcome. Since media coverage uniquely determines the steady
state, there is no path dependence on initial size and the initial majority group might not be the majority in the
long run.
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is willing to watch some TV (equation 7). Reducing  has the same e¤ects. In the limit when
 = 0 TV no longer provides entertainment and its role is reduced to oblique socialization. Parents
will still let their children watch TV, because direct socialization is costly. Since TV time is now
only a substitute for direct socialization, the majority parents will require full coverage not to
invest in direct socialization, hence by Proposition 1 the optimal coverage is q1 = 1 leading to the
extinction of the minority trait. To preserve some degree of cultural diversity under a monopolistic
TV industry, a su¢ ciently high entertainment value is required since it serves as a counter-balance
to cultural dislike.
4 Competitive media industry
We now modify the previous model to allow for a competitive media industry. We rst consider
free-to-air competition (Section 4.1). Next, we study a pay-TV duopolist where each TV rm has
two instruments to maximize prots: the coverage of cultural traits and the fee charged to viewers
(Section 4.2). Finally, we analyze competition when there is a mixed duopoly with one free-to-air
and one pay-TV rm (Section 4.3).
4.1 Free-to-air competition
With a duopolistic media industry individuals will decide both which channel to watch and for how
long.16 Let qji denote the coverage of trait i by channel j where j = I; II. Parents will choose the
channel that gives a higher coverage to their own trait. If both channels give the same coverage,
we assume that they are chosen with equal probability. The time devoted to socialization by an
individual with trait i who is watching channel j is equal to
tji = max

0;

V
 
1  qji
   =c	 : (8)
Both channels simultaneously decide the coverage of each cultural trait. Each channel j; taking
as given the choice of the other channel  j, decides the coverages qj1 and qj2 (with qj2 = 1  qj1) to
16This setup is similar to Richardson (2006) where two radio channels have to decide the amount of local and
foreign content. However, in Richardson (2006) consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their taste over the mixture
between local and foreign content. In our model each parent prefers the channel that transmits its cultural trait.
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maximize its revenue from advertisement given by

h
n
 
1  tj1

1qj1>q
 j
1
+ (1  n)  1  tj2 1qj2<q j2 +   n  1  tj1+ (1  n) (1  t2) =2 1qji=q ji i : (9)
where 1A is the indicator function which takes the value 1 if A is true and zero otherwise. Notice
that if both channels cover both groups equally (qji = q
 j
i ), they will split the audience. We now
describe the coverage of each cultural trait by the media industry.
Proposition 3 (Competitive free-to-air) For a su¢ ciently large majority n  n where
n =
c+ V   
2c+ V    (10)
only the majority trait will be covered qI1 = q
II
1 = 1. Otherwise rms will specialize on di¤erent
traits, (qI1 = 0; q
II
1 = 1 or q
I
1 = 1; q
II
1 = 0).
17
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 3 says that it is always optimal for TV rms to cover only one trait. In a duopoly,
given that channel I has specialized in covering one of the two cultures, there is no benet for
channel II from partially broadcasting that cultures trait because anyone from that culture will
strictly prefer to watch channel I and have their children only exposed to their own culture.
Similarly, if the rst duopolist is not specializing, the second channel can capture the entire market
for the biggest (most protable) of the two cultures. In other words, specialization is a dominant
strategy. As a consequence, when group sizes are su¢ ciently similar the two channels diversify
on covering one cultural trait each,18 while only the majority trait is covered for a su¢ ciently
large majority(n > n). Specialization on one cultural group is more likely for lower values of
cultural intolerance V , higher entertainment value  and higher cost of socialization c.19 The
intuition is simple. Those changes in parameters make socialization more costly or less desirable
and therefore increase the TV watching by the minority which is not covered, increasing the
incentive to concentrate on the bigger group even if the di¤erence in size is not too big.
We now show that the dynamics is rather simple. First, notice that if the majority is su¢ ciently
large (no > n), both rms specialize on this trait, hence the minority trait will disappear in the
17In the proof we show that there also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium for these parameters.
18Since the channel covering the majority trait makes larger prots, there also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium
for this parameter range where both channels cover the majority trait with the same probability.
19For the formal argument see the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix A.2.
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long run.20 If, however, 1
2
6 n0 6 n and rms play a pure strategy equilibrium, i.e. they diversify
on covering di¤erent traits, then group sizes remain constant.21 These insights are summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 4 For a su¢ ciently big majority n0 > n, the system converges to n = 1: For a
smaller majority 1=2 6 n0 6 n the system converges to n = n0.
In other words, only minority groups that are su¢ ciently big so that one of the competing
rms is willing to cover the minority trait can survive in the long-run.
In line with the intuition, it is simple to show that as the number of channels competing in
the media market increases, the result that both cultural groups receive full coverage is more and
more likely. Consider for instance three channels, then qI1 = q
II
1 = q
III
1 = 1 is an equilibrium
if  [n+ (1  n) (1  t2)] =3 >  (1  n) that is if n > (2c+ V   ) = (3c+ V   ) which is
clearly bigger than n: In other words, as the number of channels increases, the probability of
cultural concentration tends to zero. Our model therefore predicts that
Corollary 1 Cultural extinction is more likely in a competitive media industry than in a monop-
olistic market. Moreover, a duopolistic market is the worst case scenario for cultural survival.
However, a duopolistic TV industry does not always do worse than a monopoly in preserving
cultural diversity. Indeed, as we argued in the previous section, if TV has no entertainment role,
then a monopolistic free-to-air industry automatically leads to cultural extinction. In this case
the only hope for cultural survival is competition. Therefore,
Corollary 2 If the media provides little entertainment value a competitive market is likely to lead
to a larger minority group than a monopolistic one.22
20At n both the concentration equilibrium (qI1 = q
II
2 = 1) and the diversication equilibria (q
I
1 = 0, q
II
2 = 1) or
(qI1 = 1, q
II
2 = 0) exist. However, the diversication equilibria are Pareto superior, so we concentrate on them.
21It is easy to show using standard martingale theory that the mixed strategy equilibrium would lead to cultural
extinction of either the minority or the majority group. Over time the group size will almost surely fall outside the
bounds for which the mixed strategy equilibrium is dened (1   n  n  n) leading to full coverage of the group
which is the majority when the bounds are threshpassed. While we present this result for completeness, from now
on we will concentrate on pure strategies only in the dynamics.
22Competition will lead to a larger minority size in the long run whenever the initial majority group size n0 is
such that 12  n0  min [n; nb ] where nb is the steady state majority group size under monopoly (equation 7).Notice
that this is always the case for  = 0 and likely to be satised for positive but small .
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4.2 Pay-TV duopoly
In this section we study competition between two pay-TV rms. As in Peitz and Valletti (2008),
we model this as a two-stage game. In the rst stage both TV rms determine the coverage of
each cultural trait.23 In the second stage they set the fee sj a viewer has to pay. The rest of the
model is unchanged. The parents maximization problem is now given by
max
tji
U i(qji ; s
j) = (1  tji ) + tjiV + (1  tji )qjiV + (1  tji )(1  qji )v  
1
2
ctj2i   sj:
The time devoted to socialization is unchanged and equal to (8). Parents now trade o¤coverage
and fee and will choose the channel that o¤ers the largest utility, that is, U ij = max
j2fI;IIg
U i(qji ; s
j):We
assume that if both TV rms provide viewers with the same utility and the same coverage, they
are chosen with equal probability. However, if the utility is the same but coverage di¤ers, the tie
is broken in favor of the rm providing more coverage. The following two fee levels will be crucial
in the analysis. Let smax =  + V be the maximum fee that a cultural group that receives full
coverage is willing to pay dened by U ij(1; s
max) = 0. Second, let bs = V   (V   )2 =2c be
the maximum fee that a cultural group that receives no TV coverage is willing to pay, dened by
U ij(0; bs) = 0. The next proposition describes the coverage of each cultural trait and the fee chosen
in equilibrium for a su¢ ciently low advertisement sensitivity.24
Proposition 5 (Competitive pay-TV) Let  < smax  bs. For a su¢ ciently big majority group
n  n(smax) where
n(smax) =
2csmax +  (c+ V   )
2csmax +  (2c+ V   ) (11)
both rms will charge no fees (sI = sII = 0) and concentrate on covering the majority (qI1 =
qII1 = 1) leading to the long-run elimination of the minority. Otherwise both rms will charge
the maximum fee sI = sII = smax and will specialize on di¤erent traits (qI1 = 0; q
II
1 = 1 or
qI1 = 1; q
II
1 = 0 ), so that group sizes remain constant.
25
23We stick to our simple model of advertisement revenue unlike Peitz and Valletti (2008) and Armstrong and
Weeds (2007) who provide an explicit model of the advertisement market.
24If the advertisment sensitivity was too high ( > smax   bs) the pure strategy equilibria with specialization
would be destroyed by the incentive to cover the highly protable because of the revenues from advertisement 
majority group.
25There also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in this case which is characterized in the proof of the proposition.
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Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The only di¤erence compared to the case with two free-to-air TV rms is that competition
between two pay-TV increases the area where the TV rms diversify their coverage (n(smax) > n)
and hence survival of the minority group is more likely. This happens because diversication under
pay TV allows rms to charge smax making deviations to specializing on the majority trait less
attractive than under free-to-air competition. Moreover, n(smax) increases in smax =  + V , hence
the higher the entertainment value (or the value given to ones own trait), the more n(smax)and n
drift apart.26 Hence a higher entertainment value increases the chances of cultural survival of the
minority.
4.3 Mixed duopoly
We now analyze competition with one free-to-air and one pay-TV rm. Without loss of generality
let rm I be the pay-TV. Then
Proposition 6 (Competitive mixed) For a su¢ ciently big majority group n  n(bs) where
n(bs) = 2cbs+  (c+ V   )
2cbs+  (2c+ V   ) (12)
the pay TV will charge no fees (sI = 0) and both rms will concentrate on covering the majority
(qI1 = q
II
1 = 1) leading to the long-run elimination of the minority. Otherwise rms will diversify
on covering one trait each and rm I will charge sI = bs leading to no changes in group sizes.
Specically, while for su¢ ciently small majorities 1=2  n  n (where n is dened by (10)) either
rm might cover the majority trait27 (qI1 = 0; q
II
1 = 1 or q
I
1 = 1; q
II
1 = 0), for intermediate majority
sizes, n  n  n(bs) there exists just one diversication equilibrium in which the free-to-air rm
covers the majority group (qI1 = 0; q
II
1 = 1).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Notice that the diversication equilibrium where the pay-TV rm covers the minority is more
likely to exist. The pay-TV rm charges sI = bs under diversication of coverages and therefore
has less incentives to deviate to covering the majority group (losing the fee) than a free-to-air rm.
26Indeed, the survival of the minority group under pay-TV-competition becomes more likely for higher enter-
tainment values @n(s
max)
@ > 0 which stands in sharp contrast to free-to-air competition where
@n
@ < 0:
27There also exists a mixed equilibrium in this case as described in the proof of the proposition.
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This explains why the existence of a pay-TV rm increases the likelihood to have a pure strategy
equilibriumwith diversication. Consequently, the area where the TV rms diversify their coverage
is largest for competition between two pay-TV, intermediate when there is a mixed duopoly with
one free-to-air and one pay-TV rm, and smallest with two free-to-air rms (n(smax) > n(bs) > n).
Comparing the di¤erent market structures we can therefore conclude that
Corollary 3 The presence of pay-TV rms decrease the probability of cultural extinction. This
probability is smallest if all competing rms are pay-TV rms. Moreover, higher entertainment
values amplify the advantage for cultural survival of pay-TV relative to free-to-air competition.
5 Robustness
To check for the robustness of our results we introduce variations in our basic model (free-to-
air media industry). We endogenize the entertainment value in two ways (i) it is strategically
chosen by rms (Section 5.1) and (ii) it depends on cultural coverage and cultural intolerance
(Section 5.2). In Section 5.3 we introduce various asymmetries across traits such as di¤erent
advertisement sensitivities and cultural intolerance. Finally we discuss the importance of some
remaining modeling assumptions.
5.1 Endogenous entertainment
Since entertainment attracts audience and is costly to produce, it is reasonable to assume that
rms might also choose the entertainment value. To illustrate how this a¤ects our results, we will
work with a very simple setup: the entertainment value is low L unless the TV rms pay the
cost k > 0 to produce a high entertainment value H , and we dene  = H   L > 0. In the
rest of the analysis we assume that V > 2H ; that group 1 is the majority n > 1=2; and that
coverage is chosen before the entertainment value.
Monopoly: A monopolistic media industry will prefer the high entertainment value whenever
it leads to higher prot.
Proposition 7 (Monopoly entertainment) If k < =c the monopolist chooses H if the
majority is not too big, i.e. n < 1  (ck=2) and L otherwise. For k  =c high quality is
never chosen.
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Proof. See Appendix A.3
Notice that the likelihood of choosing high quality programs depends positively on peoples
advertisement sensitivity, on the size of the minority group whose decision of how much time to
watch TV is dependent on quality, on the increase in quality due to the investment; while the
same decision depends negatively on the cost of increasing programsquality and socializing the
child. High quality will only be chosen if its cost is not too high and the majority is not too big.
The dynamics is exactly as in the baseline model and high quality is chosen in the long-run if and
only if nb(H)  1  (ck=2) where nb(H) is obtained by substituting H in (7).
Free-to-air competition: Let us study what happens when there are two free to air rms
that choose programsquality. With respect to the baseline model we assume that both channels
simultaneously decide the coverage of each cultural trait and only after observing the coverage
they simultaneously choose the quality jl where l = L;H. The rest of the model is unchanged.
The parents maximization problem is now given by
max
ti
U i(qji ; 
j
l ) = (1  ti)jl + tiV + (1  ti)qjiV + (1  ti)(1  qji )v  
1
2
ct2i
Since there is no heterogeneity within groups all the individuals of a group choose the same TV
time and the same channel. Moreover, people watch the channel that o¤ers the largest utility,
that is, U ij = max
j2fI;IIg
U i(qji ; 
j
l ): If both channels o¤er the same utility, they get half the audience.
This can only happen if both rms cover the same trait, since U ij(1; 
j
L) = 
j
L+V and U
i
j(0; 
j
H) =
V   (V 
j
H)
2
2c
; so that it is always true that U ij(1; 
j
L) > U
i
j(0; 
j
H): Proposition 8 describes
the pure strategy equilibrium outcome of the game for a su¢ ciently low cost of providing highly
entertaining programs.28
Proposition 8 (Competitive entertainment) Let k  [ (c  (V   L) + 2H)] =2c. For a
su¢ ciently big majority group n  nk where
nk =
 (c+ V   H) + 2ck
 (2c+ V   H)
(13)
both rms will choose H and concentrate on covering the majority (q
I
1 = q
II
1 = 1) leading to
the long-run elimination of the minority. Otherwise rms will provide L and will specialize on
di¤erent traits, so that group sizes remain constant.
28This assumption on k avoids multiple pure strategy equilibria in the second stage of the game and hence
guarantees a unique solution.
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Proof. See Appendix A.3
Similar to the case of two pay-TV rms, the two-dimensional nature of competition benets
the minority group by increasing the attractiveness of diversication in coverage. If both rms
cover the same trait, the competition in quality is very tough. This makes deviating to covering
the other trait more protable because it reduces the competition in quality (nk > n). Smaller
minorities are now able to survive in the long run, but the price is a lower entertainment value for
everybody.
5.2 Entertainment depends on cultural coverage and intolerance
Our basic model assumes a constant entertainment value. While this is a reasonable starting point,
it is more realistic to assume that the entertainment value might depend on the trait covered by the
TV and on the parents degree of cultural intolerance. People tend to particularly enjoy programs
that positively represent their own culture. Black audiences prefer soap operas with mainly black
actors except for the baddieswhile white audiences prefer the opposite (Poindexter and Stroman,
1981).29 One way to cover a culture is to give the message of its cultural superiority in the stories
told by television. These assumptions can be captured by the following functional form
i(qi;V ) =    (1  qi)V + qiV
with ;  and  all positive. The rst term represents a pure entertainment e¤ect, the second is a
negative e¤ect from watching programs covering the other trait, and the third is a positive e¤ect
from watching programs covering ones trait. The last two e¤ects are both weighted with the
degree of cultural intolerance. Let # = + : Then we can redene the entertainment function as
i(qi;V ) =    V + #qiV:
It is immediate to see that the total entertainment from watching TV is always increasing in
the coverage of ones trait qi:Moreover, i(qi;V ) can be both increasing or decreasing in cultural
intolerance and the sign of the derivative depends on the coverage of ones trait qi: Specically,
total entertainment from watching TV is increasing in cultural intolerance if and only if the
29Atkin (1992) analyzes US television series with minority-lead characters and nds that the observed increase
in Black-lead characters is due to commercial purposes: Back-lead characters attract the Black audience that has
become a highly sought after target by advertisers.
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coverage of ones trait is su¢ ciently large, that is qi > =#: Finally, the cross derivative coverage
and intolerance is always positive: the more intolerant you are, the more you enjoy your trait
being covered by TV. It is easy to see that none of our qualitative results are a¤ected by these
changes. Following the same steps as in the previous analysis it can be shown that the time
devoted to watch television, is ti = max f0; [V (1  qi)  i(qi;V )] =cg and that the condition
V ? 2 now becomes V (1 + 2   #) = V (1 +    ) ? 2. A monopolistic media industry
with V (1 +    ) > 2 will choose coverage q1 = V (1+) V (1+#) = V (1+) V (1++) and both traits will
survive in the long run. Similarly, the qualitative results under competition remain the same.
Hence, our analysis is robust to these changes.30
5.3 Heterogeneous cultural groups
In this subsection we introduce two additional sources of heterogeneity: advertisement sensitivity
and the degree of cultural intolerance. Let 1 =  and 2 =  with  > 0 where  describes the
relative advertisement protability of a member of group 2 relative to a member of group 1. Let
V1 = V and V2 = V; where the parameter  measures the relative cultural intolerance of
group 2 with respect to group 1. Observe that the protability of a group now depends on the
size of the group, on the relative advertisement sensitivity of the group and the groups relative
cultural intolerance and we therefore can no longer present results in terms of the majority group.
Without loss of generality we assume   1; i.e. group 1 is culturally more intolerant.31 We will
focus on V > 2 so that the media industry cannot capture full TV time by both cultural traits.
These assumptions result in the following restriction on :
min = = (V   )    max = 1. (14)
Under this characterization a monopolistic media industry maximizes
 = max
qi
 [n (1  t1) + (1  n) (1  t2)] : (15)
30The above formulation can also capture the case where the entertainment value depends only on cultural
coverage. In this setup V = 1;  = 0 and  = . In this world the parameter area where a monopolistic TV
industry can capture full TV time of both audiences disappears and the interval for which both groups are covered
by a competitive media industry is now larger, reducing the danger of cultural extinction.
31Now Assumption 1 boils down to c  V     V     0:
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Following the same steps as in Proposition 1 it is easy to show that a monopolistic TV industry
will give more coverage to the more protable group to capture its entire TV time. More formally,
for n  en (where n is the size of group 1) the optimal coverage is qa1 = 1  qa2 = qa = =V and
only trait 1 invests in education while for n > en the optimal coverage is qb1 = qb = 1  =V and
only trait 2 invests in education where
en = 
1 + 
= 1  1
1 + 
: (16)
Since higher  and  increase group 2s protability, the threshold en is increasing in  and .
Therefore, for given group sizes, an increase in the relative advertisement sensitivity of one group
with respect to the other and/or an increase in its relative cultural intolerance increases the
probability that this group gets more coverage.
The dynamics of the cultural trait 1 is still driven by equation (5) but now - since we have two
possible coverages - we have two steady state candidates, namely
na =
c
V
c V  1  
V
2
+ 
 
1  
V
 (17)
and
nb = 1 
c
V
c  V  1  
V
2
+ 
 
1  
V
 : (18)
Notice that these potential steady states are always interior.32 Also, they are independent of
the advertisement sensitivity  because neither coverage nor optimal TV time depend on . Also
na  nb ,33 however the threshold en dened by (16) which determines whether the TV industry
chooses qa or qb is not guaranteed to fall in between the two steady states candidates. On the one
hand, a low (high) advertisement sensitivity might push en below na (above nb) which is una¤ected
by changes in . On the other hand, changes in the groups relative cultural intolerance a¤ect bothen and the steady state candidates. Specically, while a decrease in  leads to a lower en, both na
and nb increase,
34 meaning that group 1 gets larger in the steady state candidates because group
2 becomes relatively less intolerant. This gives rise to three cases: (i) if na  en  nb , initial group
size determines which steady state is reached : na is reached if the initial size is smaller than en;
32For 0 < na < 1 we need c >
V  
 = V       while for 0 < nb < 1 we need c > V      . Both
conditions are guaranteed by Assumption 1.
33See Lemma 1 in Appendix B.
34Simple calculations show that @n

a
@ < 0 and
@nb
@ < 0.
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while nb is reached otherwise. (ii) If en > nb the system always converges to na. (iii) If en < na the
system always converges to nb . Hence in cases (ii) and (iii) there is a unique steady state.
35 The
steady states are illustrated in Figure 1.36 The picture shows that nb can only be an equilibrium
if group 2 is not too sensitive to advertisement (there is an upper bound on ). Moreover, if
group 2 becomes more culturally intolerant (higher ), this change must be accompanied by a
lower advertisement sensitivity and vice versa. This happens because higher  and  make group
2 more valuable for the media industry relative to group 1. Hence, if these values become too high
the media industry would like to capture group 2s entire TV time resulting in na.
[Include Figure 1 around here]
The gure nicely illustrates that for any xed  > min as  increases the steady state will
change from nb to a region where convergence depends on the initial size of the groups and nally
to na.
We can therefore derive the following empirical predictions. Increasing the relative advertise-
ment sensitivity of one group with respect to the other and/or its relative cultural intolerance,
increases the probability of moving to a steady state in which this group is larger.
If we allow for a competitive media industry, the analysis of the problem is similar to the
symmetric case except that now we have to look at all possible group sizes since being the majority
is no longer equivalent to being the most protable group. Again for intermediate group sizes now
dened by
nh =
c
c+ c+ V     n  n
h =
 (c+ V   )
 (c+ V   ) + c (19)
the media industry specializes on di¤erent traits while outside this parameter range only the most
protable group is covered. It is instructive to study when both groups are covered. First, notice
that only nh is a¤ected by  and it is increasing in , making specialization on di¤erent traits most
likely for  = 1 when both groups are equally intolerant. Moreover, the size of the interval for
which both traits are covered (nh   nh) is increasing for  < b, decreasing for  > b and largest
35Notice that this does not mean that there is a unique coverage during the process of convergence. To see this
assume en > nb and let the initial group size lie above en. Then TV coverage qb is implemented temporarily leading
to a shrinking in group size until nt < en in some period t and the media industry switches to the steady state
policy qa:
36For a formal analysis see Appenix B.
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for  = b, where b = p(c   + V) (c   + V )= (c   + V ) :37 Notice that for  = 1 we
have that b = 1 as well. Indeed, this analysis uncovers that the thresholds on n drift apart, the
more equalthe groups are. If  < 1 meaning that group 1 is more radical than group 2 than
this must be countervailed by a higher sensitivity to advertisement (b > 1) for group 2.
The previous discussion adds a couple of new empirical predictions: A decrease in the size of a
group, its advertisement sensitivity or its degree of cultural intolerance will decrease the probability
that the media industry will concentrate to cover that group. Finally, the comparison between
monopolistic and competitive media industry is una¤ected: competition is still more likely to lead
to cultural extinction.38
5.4 Discussion of further assumptions
5.4.1 Non-myopic monopolist
Our agents are short-sighted: parents only care about their children and the TV industry only cares
about their present prots. The assumption on parents is consistent with the entire literature on
cultural transmission. But especially a monopolistic TV industry want to manipulate the cultural
dynamics of the groups, if it care about future prots. This manipulation is most attractive if
the entertainment value is low compared to cultural intolerance, so that the monopolist can never
capture full TV time of both cultural groups. But if one group got eliminated, future prots
are maximized and this will happen sooner, the lower the coverage of this group in the present.
Therefore, the monopolist faces a trade-o¤, losing some of the present prots for higher future
prots. The outcome depends on how much the monopolist discounts the future. While a very
patient monopolist will manipulate the dynamics and drive one group to extinction, a su¢ ciently
impatient monopolist will behave as the myopic agent in our model.
5.4.2 Evolving cultural intolerance
In our model the degree of cultural intolerance of each group is held constant. In a complex
dynamic model V it+1 might depend on V
i
t , on what people watch in TV (q
i
t), and how long
37For details on this derivation see Appendix B.
38Poor minorities could have a higher cost of socializing their children being therefore obliged to rely more on
TV time. This can be captured by our model assuming di¤erent parental costs of socialization ci. However, the
idea that a culture will not disappear when the TV market is monopolistic is robust to this extension.
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they watch it (1   tit). Since nothing can be said for a general functional form, we will postulate
a specic simple form.39 Assume that the evolution of cultural intolerance depends only on the
program content, in particular, let V it+1 = V
i
t + " where " is positive for q
i
t  q where q is
some constant level of coverage and negative otherwise. We start by discussing what happens for
q = 1
2
with initially symmetric groups except for group size and a free-to-air monopolist.40 Assume
also V0 = V > 2. The majority who gets more coverage in t = 0, becomes culturally more
intolerant while the minority becomes more tolerant. Hence it becomes harder / easier to induce
the majority / minority to watch TV. Nevertheless, the monopolist still induces full TV time from
the majority: the cuto¤ for optimality of this strategy even shrinks to n1 > (V   ") =2V . As
time passes this cuto¤ shrinks further to (V   t") =2V where t is the current time period. The
initial majority keeps radicalizing, growing and getting more coverage while the initial minority
keeps shrinking and becomes more tolerant every period, namely (V   t") where t is the current
time period. It might even become so tolerant that full TV time can be captured from both
traits. Nevertheless it disappears in the long run, since the majority requires more coverage every
period. For q > 1
2
the dynamics is similar if the majority is su¢ ciently big so that q1(t = 0) > q.
Otherwise both groups become culturally more tolerant next period, and the majority requires less
coverage to forego socialization. Over time both groups will become su¢ ciently tolerant that the
monopolist can capture full TV time of both groups. Hence the group size is totally determined
by the TV coverage with long run survival of both traits.41 Similar results hold, if the change
in cultural intolerance was weighted by TV time only that the (de)radicalization of the majority
would happen at a higher speed than the deradicalization of the minority.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
Television does not only provide entertainment but is also an important source of oblique social-
ization. To keep the model tractable, we have abstracted from other forms of socializations like
39It is an empirical question which form is most reasonable.
40Notice that this is the interesting case, since under competition either both groups get full coverage and the
group sizes stay constant or only one group gets covered leading to elimiation of the other group: this would also
happen under the present assumptions.
41If cultural intolerance remains constant for intermediate levels of coverage, i.e. " = 0 for 1 q  q  q, " < 0 for
q < 1  q and " > 0 for q > q, then our baseline model applies if 1  q1  qb1  q1. Otherwise the majority becomes
more intolerant every period, while the minority becomes more tolerant and will be eliminated in the long-run.
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inuence by peers or by the school. This simplication is appropriate since we study socializa-
tion at a very young age, due to our assumption that parents decide their childrens TV viewing.
Therefore, our model cannot be used to talk more generally about the possible impact of new
communication technologies such as internet and social networking website on cultural diversity
and evolution of preferences. To study the impact of new communication technology we would
need to enrich our model to allow for socialization to occur partly through role model e¤ects and
random social interactions outside the home which is left for future research. In the present paper
we have chosen to develop an industrial organization view of cultural transmission and preference
evolution instead studying both the demand and supply side of television and its resulting inu-
ence on cultural change. The model derives three sets of predictions concerning: (i) TV demand,
(ii) TV supply and (iii) the cultural dynamics and resulting steady states.
On the demand side the model mainly predicts that TV time is increasing in cultural cover-
age and decreasing in cultural intolerance. The communication literature provides some indirect
evidence for this prediction: people prefer home produced TV products even if worse in quality.
In other words, people watch more television if the coverage of their cultural traits is larger. In
the same vain, cultural proximity has been shown to be a key factor for TV success.42 Imported
programs that are produced in a culture which is close in terms of language, dress, ethnic types,
body language, denitions of humor, ideas about story pacing, music traditions, religious elements
etc...tend to be more successful: Brazilian telenovelas dubbed into Spanish are more popular in
Latin America than any American Soap, while Japanese and Chinese television are more successful
in Asia than American imports, to mention a few examples.
Israel is an ideal country to study di¤erent cultural groupsviewing behaviors. In their case
study Cohen (2005) and Cohen and Tukachinsky (2007) show that viewing patterns di¤er among
groups and each group watches the channel that covers their culture better. They also look at the
supply side and illustrate how the Israelian TV market has responded to demand by creating
di¤erent niches for di¤erent cultures. In this market, all traits are covered except for the ultra
orthodox Jews who do not watch TV. This is in accordance with our model: in Israel cultural
groups are of similar sizes (protability) so that a competitive TV industry nds it convenient to
42See Trepete, (2003), Straubhaar (1991, 2008), La Pastina and Straubhaar (2005), Straubhaar et al. (2003), de
Bens and Schmaele (2001)
24
cover all of them except for the ultra orthodox Jews who are very insensitive to advertisement.43
Other empirical studies44 look at di¤erent measures of channel diversity based on program type
and check how increased competition a¤ects diversity without getting a clear answer: diversity
measures can vary considerably across markets with similar number of channels. According to our
model, the e¤ect of competition on diversity depends on the relative protability of the di¤erent
cultural groups. Therefore, controlling for cultural aspects of programs and not only for program
type, for group size, advertisement sensitivity and socialization costs of di¤erent cultures can
serve as an empirical strategy to disentangle this mixed evidence.45 All our other predictions
concerning the supply side of television simply say that the relatively more protable cultural
group gets more coverage.46 Observe that protability depends on cultural intolerance: more
intolerant groups should get more coverage. The empirical test of this prediction requires data on
the relative cultural dislike of one cultural trait towards the others and is left for future research.
The third set of predictions of our model concerns the cultural dynamics. While we are
not aware of any studies testing our predictions directly,47 some e¤orts have been made to study
cultural change over time. Inglehart and Baker (2000) use the World Value Surveys to show both
massive cultural change and the persistence of distinctive cultural values. Especially the broad
heritage of a society in terms of religion is shown to leave a deep imprint on values that endure
modernization. The role of the mass media is ignored in the study. However, in a recent book
Norris and Inglehart (2009) take a rst look at the role of the media for cultural change again
using the World Value Survey and conclude that the risks to national diversity due to mass media
43Cultural groups in Israel consist of around 12% Ultra-Orthodox Jews, 18% Arabs, 20% immigrants from the
former Soviet Union while the remaining 50% is split among tradional-Mizrahi, secular-Ashkenazi and national
religious groups (Cohen, 2005).
44see e.g. Signorielli (1986), De Jong and Bates (1991), Lin, (1995), Li and Chiang (2001), Van der Wur¤ (2004,
2005).
45A possibility alluded to in Van der Wur¤ (2005) who suggests that the di¤erent channel diversity might be
due to di¤erences in audience demand for minority programmes, country-specic (cultural-historical) di¤erences
in channel programming or a combination of these factors(p.267).
46A parallel argument could be made for commercial radios concentrating on the most protable groups. Siegel-
man and Waldfogel (2001) provide empirical evidence that US commercial radio mainly covers white audiences and
underprovides minority listeners (blacks and hispanics) who have a very distinctive taste.
47The closest attempt might be due to Morgan (1986) who investigated the e¤ect of watching TV on regional
diversity in the US between 1975 and 1983 examining the General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion
Research Centre and discovered that heavy viewers had less regional diversity than light or moderate viewers.
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is exaggerated.48 Cultural extinction can occur in our model but only under special circumstances.
Parental concern about the survival of cultural traits acts as a rewall against cultural convergence.
If parents care about their culture, their children will only be allowed to watch television that gives
a su¢ cient coverage to their cultural trait. It is this aspect of the demand side that acts as an
insurance towards cultural survival and can make protectionist policies superuous.49 A serious
conclusion concerning cultural convergence versus non-convergence due to mass media can only
be given by an empirical test of our dynamic predictions.50
This paper has provided a framework that allows for the discussion of media market structure
and competitive and cultural policy in the media sector. According to our model TV programs
should not be classied as cultural exceptionsand public broad-casting is rarely justiable on
cultural grounds. Indeed, cultural extinction can only occur if the di¤erences in the groupsoverall
advertisement protability is very big and the media industry is competitive with a small number
of rms. The more competitors there are, the less likely is cultural extinction. Moreover, the
presence of pay-TV rms decrease the probability of cultural extinction and this probability is
smallest if all competing rms are pay-TV rms.51 Recent developments in the TV industry
suggest that we live in such a world.
48Disdier et al. (2010) reach the same conclusion. In their paper they o¤er systematic evidence of the inuence of
foreign media on one particular cultural trait, namely naming patterns in France. Names given to babies are seen
as emblematic characteristics of national cultural traditionsand hence expressions of cultural identity. Disdier
et al. (2010) show that despite the existence of many examples of non-traditional names in France the aggregate
impact of foreign media is modest and has changed less than 5% of the names.
49For instance, studying the Israeli TV market where all channels have quotas on Israeli productions, Cohen
(2005) discovered all commercial channels voluntarily surpassed these quotas because that was what consumers
demanded.
50In order to do so, one would need a long panel with data on peoples time use and values, together with data
on TV contents that allow for cultural di¤erentiation between channels. This very demanding task is left for future
research.
51Another interesting extension is to allow for rms to broadcast multiple channels and o¤er bundles. Crawford
and Cullen (2007) show in numerical welfare simulations that consumers would benet if cable television networks
were o¤ered à la carte. If cultural survival is a concern, this is likely to reinforce their conclusion.
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A Appendix: Symmetric Groups
A.1 Monopolistic rm
Proof of Proposition 1. The result for V  2 follows immediately from the main text and
the observation that for any 1   
V
 qi  V , the coverage of each cultural we lies above bq1 = bq2.
If V > 2, we proceed in the following way: we divide the possible coverage into three subintervals
depending on whether the TV industry can capture full TV time of one of the traits. We then determine
the optimal coverage in each of them and compare the level of prots in each subinterval to nd the
overall optimal coverage. The rst subinterval is given by all levels of media coverage that guarantee full
TV time from trait 2 and partial TV time from trait 1, namely q1  V . It is easy to see that qa1 = V
is optimal, since (1  t1) is increasing in q while (1  t2) is constant and equal to 1. Using (3), (2) and
qa1 =

V
; prots are easily shown to be equal to a = 

(1  n) + n   c+2 V
c

:We now solve for the
last subinterval where only trait 2 socializes and trait 2 watches TV all the time, namely q1  1  V .
Given that (1  t1) is constant and equal to 1, while (1  t2) is decreasing in q the optimal coverage mix
is qb = 1   
V
and prots are equal to b dened by (4). Finally, in the subinterval where both traits
socialize, namely 
V
 qi  1  V the rm has to maximize
max

V
qi1  V


n

c+   V (1  qi)
c

+ (1  n)

c+   V qi
c

:
Since the problem is linear, we get a corner solution leading either to qa1 and 
a or to qb1 and 
b. It is
easy to show that a  b whenever n  en = 1
2
.
A.2 Competitive media industries
Proof of Proposition 3. We rst show that (qI1 = 0; q
II
1 = 1) and (q
I
1 = 1; q
II
1 = 0) are two pure
strategy Nash equilibria for all 1=2 6 n 6 n: In those equilibria the channel (no matter which) covering
group 2 gets prots  (1  n) while the only protable deviation is to cover group 1 only which would
give prots 1 =  [n+ (1  n) (1  t2)] =2 where t2 = (V   ) =c, hence
1 = [c  (1  n) (V   )] =2c (20)
which is not protable for n  n: For the channel covering group 1, instead, prots are equal to
n; while deviating to cover group 2 would give the prots 2 =  [n (1  t1) + (1  n)] =2 where
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t1 = (V   ) =c, hence
2 = [c  n (V   )] =2c (21)
and this is not protable for n  c= (2c+ V   ) which is smaller than 1=2:
There also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium with pI = pII = c+V  n(2c+V )
V  for all 1=2 
n  n where pj is the probability to specialize on the minority trait. The probability pII must
make rm I indi¤erent between playing qI1 = 0 or q
I
1 = 1 i.e., 
I
 
qI1 = 0

= I
 
qI1 = 1

where
I
 
qI1 = 0

= 

pII2 +
 
1  pII (1  n) and I  qI1 = 1 =  pIIn+  1  pII1 : At the
same time the probability pI must make rm II indi¤erent between playing qII1 = 0 or q
II
1 = 1 i.e.,
II
 
qII1 = 0

= II
 
qII1 = 1

where II
 
qII1 = 0

and II
 
qII1 = 1

are identical to I
 
qI1 = 0

and I
 
qI1 = 1

with pI in place of pII : After some algebra the equilibrium probabilities immediately
follow. Finally, the bounds are found by checking the conditions 0  pI = pII  1 and recalling that
n > 1=2 by assumption. Next, we show that for n  n; qI1 = qII1 = 1 is an equilibrium. Indeed, for
qI1 = q
II
1 = 1 the only possible deviations are for q < 1 which would at most guarantee prots  (1  n)
to the deviating channel: Then, qI1 = q
II
1 = 1 is an equilibrium if 2 >  (1  n) ; that is if n  n:
Instead qI1 = q
II
1 = 0 would be an equilibrium if 2 > n; that is if n  c2c+V  = 1   n but
since n > 1=2 by assumption this is never the case. We now show that there are no other pure strategy
Nash equilibria. Assume there exist an equilibrium with qI1 > q
II
1 (di¤erent from (q
I
1 = 1; q
II
1 = 0)) then
channel I would get prots n (1  t1) and channel II would get prots  (1  n) (1  t2) : This is never
an equilibrium for (1  t1) and/or (1  t2) smaller than 1: In that case I and/or II could deviate and
get a larger audience by increasing qI1 and/or decreasing q
II
1 : This is always true since t

1 is non-increasing
in q while t2 is non-decreasing in q and there are some q such that t

1 = t

2 = 0: If instead, (1  t1)
and (1  t2) both equal 1; again this cannot be an equilibrium: Indeed, since n > 12 channel II; would
prot from deviating to a qI1 < q
II
1 because this deviation would get n which is more than the candidate
equilibrium payo¤  (1  n). Notice that this reasoning does not work if qI1 is already equal to 1 as in
(qI1 = 1; q
II
1 = 0). A similar reasoning shows that there is never an equilibrium for q
I
1 < q
II
1 : Assume
now that there exist an equilibrium with qI1 = q
II
1 (di¤erent from q
I
1 = q
II
1 = 1) then both channels
would get prots  [n (1  t1) + (1  n) (1  t2)] =2: In this case the best possible deviation would be
to satisfy completely (1  ti = 1) the most protable group. Therefore, since n > 12 ; (that is group 1 is
the more protable group), a deviation to a q > qI1 = q
II
1 would give to the deviating channel a prot
of n: Then, qI1 = q
II
1 will be an equilibrium if  [n (1  t1) + (1  n) (1  t2)] =2 > n and this is not
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possible for n > 1
2
even if (1  t1) = (1  t2) = 1:
We now show what happens to the size of the interval for which specialization on di¤erent cultural
traits occurs
n  1=2 = c+ V   
2c+ V      1=2:
It is immediate to see that the size of the interval decreases with respect to c and  and increases with
respect to V .
Proof of Proposition 5. Competition is now a two stage game which we solve by backward
induction. In the second stage TV rms simultaneously choose their optimal fees after observing the
coverages chosen in the rst stage. Notice that price competition in the second stage does not alter the
fact that specialization is a dominant strategy in the rst stage, hence we will only consider qj1 = 0 or
qj1 = 1 as possible coverages. By usual reasoning rms will choose s = 0 in the second stage if they
concentrate on the same trait. Otherwise, rms will be able to set positive prices. The maximum price
smax is an equilibrium if the rm covering the minority group (say rm j) does not want to deviate to a
lower bs " where bs is the price that would make the majority group indi¤erent between the two channels,
i.e. U1j (0; bs) = U1 j(1; smax) = 0. This requires that (1  n) ( + smax) > 21 + (bs  ") where 1 is
dened by (20) or equivalently when "! 0 that
n < ns =
c [smax   bs] +  (V   )
 (c+ V   )
Since by assumption  < [smax   bs] this deviation is never protable. Hence if coverages are di¤erent,
rms always choose smax. We therefore can write the normal form of the rst stage as follows where 1
and 2 are dened by (20) and (21) respectively
Firm II
qI1= 0 q
I
1= 1
Firm I qII1 = 0 2; 2 (1  n) ( + smax) ; n ( + smax)
qII1 = 1 n ( + s
max) ; (1  n) ( + smax) 1; 1
From this payo¤ matrix and following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 3 it is easy to
show that: rst, qj1 = 0, q
 j
1 = 1 with s
j = s j = smax are two pure Nash equilibria for all 1
2
 n 
n (smax), (most protable deviation is avoided if (1  n) ( + smax) > 1); second, qI1 = qII1 = 1 with
sI = sII = 0 is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for all n  n(smax); third, for all 1=2 6 n 6 n(smax),
there is also a mixed strategy equilibrium with pI = pII = (c (1 n)(V )) 2c(1 n)(+s
max)
(2c V+) 2c(+smax) where p
j is
the probability with which the minority group is covered by rm j. Finally, simple algebra shows that
n(smax) = 2cs
max+(c+V )
2csmax+(2c+V ) >
c+V 
2c+V  = n: The resulting dynamics are trivial.
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Proof of Proposition 6. Competition is a two stage game, where in the second stage only rm I
chooses its fee and rm II chooses s = 0. By standard arguments rm I will set s = 0 if qI1 = q
II
2 . If
qI1 6= qII2 , rm 1 sets a positive fee bs which leaves the trait that gets more coverage by rm 1 indi¤erent
between watching rm Is channel or rm IIs channel which is free. By the same arguments as in the
proof of Proposition 3, the only possible rst period outcomes are either qj1 = 0 or q
j
1 = 1. Hence if rms
specialize on di¤erent traits bs is determined by U iI(1; bs) = U iII(0; 0). We can then write the game played
in the rst stage as follows where 1 and 2 are dened by (20) and (21) respectively
Firm II
qI1= 0 q
I
1= 1
Firm I qII1 = 0 2; 2 (1  n) ( + bs) ; n
qII1 = 1 n ( + bs) ; (1  n)  1; 1
From this payo¤ matrix and following the same steps as in the proof of Propositions 3 and 5 it is
simple to show that: rst, qI1 = 1; q
II
1 = 0 with s
I = bs is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for all
1=2 6 n 6 n; second, for all 1=2  n  n(bs), there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium qI1 = 0; qII1 = 1
and sI = bs; third, qI1 = qII1 = 1 with sI = sII = 0 is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for all n  n(bs);
fourth, for 1
2
6 n 6 n, there is also a mixed strategy equilibrium with pI = (1 n)(V +2c) c
V  and
pII = 2c(1 n)(+bs) (c (1 n)(V ))
(V )+2cbs where pj is the probability with which the minority group is covered
by rm j. Finally, to show that n(smax) > n(bs) > n it is su¢ cient to notice that n(s) = 2cs+(c+V )
2cs+(2c+V ) is
increasing in s; that n(s) tends to n when s goes to zero and that smax > bs: The resulting dynamics are
trivial.
A.3 Endogenous entertainment
Proof of Proposition 7. Following the same steps as in our baseline model it is easy to show that he
two possible level of prot areH = 
h
n+ (1  n)

1  V 2H
c
i
 k andL = 
h
n+ (1  n)

1  V 2L
c
i
.
The media rm will prefer the high entertainment level if and only if H  L which is equivalent to
n  bn = 1  ck
2
: High quality can only be an equilibrium outcome if bn > 1
2
, k < 
2
.
Proof of Proposition 8. The possibility to choose entertainment in the second stage does not
alter the fact that covering only one trait is a dominant strategy in the rst stage, hence we will only
consider qj1 = 0 or q
j
1 = 1 as possible coverages. We start by looking at the second stage. If q
I
1 = q
II
1
then there is always an equilibrium in which both rms choose H . There might also be an equilibrium
in which both rms choose L. In particular, q
I
1 = q
II
1 = 1 and L is an equilibrium if 
L
1 >
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2H1   k , n < 1   c( 2k)(V 2H+L) = nk. Similarly, q
I
1 = q
II
1 = 0 and L is an equilibrium if
L2 > 2
H
2   k , n > c( 2k)(V 2H+L) = 1   nk; where 
l
1 and 
l
2 for l = L;H are obtained by
(20) and (21) substituting l to : However, these equilibria do not exist if
c( 2k)
(V 2H+L) > 1, or if
k < (c (V L)+2H)
2c
. If qI1 6= qII1 then both rms will choose L since they are not able to capture any
additional demand by deviating to H : Hence we get the following rst stage payo¤s taking the second
stage reactions into account.
Firm II
qI1= 0 q
I
1= 1
Firm I qII1 = 0 
H
2  k; H2  k (1  n) ; n
qII1 = 1 n; (1  n)  H1  k; H1  k
From this payo¤ matrix and following the same steps as in the proof of Propositions 3 it is easy to
show that qI1= q
II
1 = 1 and H is an equilibrium if 
H
1   k > (1  n)  , n > nk = (c+V H)+2ck(2c+V H)
while for 1
2
< n < nk rms diversify their coverage. The resulting dynamics is trivial.
B Appendix: Heterogeneous cultural groups
B.1 Dynamics with a monopolistic TV industry
As explained in the main text, with heterogeneous cultural groups and a monopolistic TV industry there
are two candidate steady states in equilibrium: na dened by (22) and n

b dened by (23). To understand
which of the two candidates steady states is an equilibrium we check if for na and n

b the TV industry
chooses qa and qb respectively. Hence, we check the location of na and n

b with respect to the thresholden dened by (16). We rst show that na  nb .
Lemma 1 na  nb
Proof. Recall that min = V     max = 1. Simple algebra reveals that na = nb at min
while na < n

b at max since n

a(max) < n

b(max) , (V   2) c > (V   2) (V   ) which
is always true by assumption 1. Also both na and n

b strictly decrease in . Therefore if we can show
that
@na@ jmin  > @nb@ jmin  we have established that na  nb . Simple algebra reveals that @na@ jmin  >@nb@ jmin , (V   )2 ( (3V   4) + V c) > 0 which is always true since we are in the parameter
area where V > 2.
This leaves three possible scenarios:
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1. For na  en  nb both na and nb are stable. The dynamics converges to na if the initial n0 < en
and to nb otherwise. Our benchmark case (symmetric cultural traits) falls into this scenario.
2. For na  nb < en the system converges to na.
3. For en < na  nb the system converges to nb .
Proposition 9 derives the parameter conditions on  and  for which cases 1, 2 and 3 occur.
Proposition 9 (Steady states) There exist thresholds a; b; c; a and b; (all given in the proof)
such that the steady states are as follows:
1. for  < a the system converges to nb ;
2. for a    b the system converges to nb for min   < a while for a    max the
system converges to na whenever the initial n0 < en and converges to nb otherwise;
3. for b <   c we get the following subcases:
(a) for min   < a the system converges to nb ;
(b) for a    b the system converges to na whenever the initial n0 < en and converges to nb
otherwise;
(c) for b <   max the system converges to na.
4. for  > c the system converges to na:
In steady state na the media industry chooses coverage q
a and only trait 1 invest in education. In
steady state nb the media industry chooses coverage q
b and only trait 2 parents invest in education.
Proof of Proposition 9. The dynamics give us the conditions for stability: na is stable whenever
na  en; while nb is stable whenever en  nb . We rst translate these conditions into restrictions on the
parameter . Since both na and n

b are decreasing while en is increasing in ; simple algebra delivers that
na  en whenever   a where
a =
  (2V   c  )  +
q
2 (2V   c  )2 2 + 4( + c)V (c+   V )
2V (c+   V ) (22)
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while en  nb whenever   b where
b =
(V   ) (c+ )
(V   )2 + c: (23)
Moreover both a and b are decreasing in . We then compare these thresholds with the permitted
range of  as dened by min =

V   max = 1 and translate this into restrictions on . Simple
algebra gives us the following results:
 na is always unstable if max[a; max] = a or equivalently if  < a with
a =
c
(V   )(c+ 2  V ) (24)
 nb is always stable if max[b; max] = b or equivalently if   b with
b =
(V   )(c+ 2  V )
c
: (25)
 na is always stable if min[a; min] =a and nb is always unstable if min[b; min] =b; or equiva-
lently if  > c where
c =
(V   )2
2
: (26)
Since the condition for complete instability for nb and for complete stability for n

a coincide at  > c
dened by (26) whenever nb is completely unstable for all permitted , n

a is completely stable: we are
in case 2. The conditions for complete instability of na; namely  < a dened by (24) and complete
stability of nb ; namely  < b dened by (25) do not coincide, however it can be shown by simple algebra
that a < b, so complete instability of na (namely  < a) implies complete stability of n

b for all
possible : we are in case 3. For a    b we are also in case 3 for min <  < a and in case 1
for a <  < max. Lemma 2 establishes that a  b for b    c, hence we are in case 1 for
a    b, in case 2 for b <   max and in case 3 for min   < a.
Lemma 2 For b <   c it is always the case that a < b.
Proof. We know that for b <  < c both a and b are interior with respect to min and max. We
rst compare a and b in general and then show that if they lie between min and max it must be the
case that b > a. After some reformulation a Q b is equivalent to
4V c (c+   V )  V 2 + 2   2   2V   
V 2 + 2 (1  )  2V  (c + ) + V   2   c2 Q 0:
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By Assumption 1 the rst bracket is positive, hence we have to look at the second and third bracket only 
V 2 + 2   2   2V    V 2 + 2 (1  )  2V  (c + ) + V   2   c2 Q 0: (27)
Equation (27) tells us that there are two values of , say 1 and 2; for which a = b. Those values
of  can be calculated equating (27) to zero: The zero of the rst bracket of (27) gives 2 which
happens to coincide with c while the zero of the second bracket gives us 1. The rst bracket is
positive
 
V 2 + 2   2   2V  > 0 for  < c dened by (26) which is the condition that both
b > min and a > min. Hence we only need to sign 
V 2 + 2 (1  )  2V  (c + ) + V   2   c2
=
 
(V   )2   2 (c + ) + V   2   c2 (28)
= (V   )2  +   c (V   )2 +  2   c2V   3  2c2: (29)
If we could prove that the sign is negative for b < max and a < max, we would have shown that
b > a. It is clear from (29) that the sign becomes negative for high . From the argument leading to
(25) we know that b < max requires  > b =
(V )(c+2 V )
c
> 1 > c
(V )(c+2 V ) = a. But
the value of (28) at  = 1 is given by  V (c+ ) (c+   V ) < 0 always. Hence, we can conclude
that b > a. In general, the proof shows that a < b if and only if 1 <  < 2.
The lemma implies that in this last area (b <   c) nb is the only stable steady state for  <
a, while na is the only stable steady state for  > b: In the middle region (a    b) the initial n0
determines which state is reached.
B.2 Competitive free-to-air media industry
We now turn to the analysis of a competitive media industry. It is trivial to extend the proof of Proposition
3 to get the generalized thresholds nh and nh given by (19). Now the size of the interval for which
specialization on di¤erent cultural traits occurs is
nh   nh = 
 
2   2c + cV + V 2  V  + cV   V 
(c+ c   + V ) (c   + V + c) :
The term in brackets at the numerator can be rewritten as (c+ V   ) (V   ) + c(V   ) and
is positive (Assumption 1). Hence, the sign of the derivative with respect to the advertisement sensitivity
 is equal to the sign of the following expression: c (c   + V   c2 + 2   V 2) which is zero
for  = b = p(c +V)(c +V )
c +V  , implying that n
h  nh is increasing for  < b, decreasing for  > b
and largest for  = b.
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Figure 1: Convergence to steady states with a monopolistic TV industry
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